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from treatises, and sections of the Restatements cram the book and offer take-
off points for exciting discussions on a great variety of live and important
questions. And there is more of Wright's original work in the volume than
appears at first glance. His notes, questions and comments are set in text type
and bear no distinguishing headings; the result is that despite their frequency
they will be easily missed by the page-flipping teacher making a casual inspec-
tion. They deserve a closer look, for Wright writes well, his comments are
pointed, and his questions, directed to the functions of rules and the needs
presently unmet by existing remedial doctrines, are searching.
But, above all, the book as a whole cuts across traditional curricular lines
io present a simplifying and sensible course pattern. Most of the editor's
faults can be charged to his ambition and to his enthusiasm for his job. In try-
ing to bring together in one book enough teachable materials to support a
large part of an entire legal education, he has spread himself much too thin.
He has had to over-edit and to over-organize and so in the end he has produced
too rigid and too busy a teaching tool. But if Professor Wright's reach has
thus exceeded his grasp, legal education is the richer for it. His Cases on
Remedies ought to stimulate curriculum committees in general and Damages,
Restitution and Equity teachers in particular to some hard and much needed
thinking.
ADDISON MUELLERt
THE SUPREME COURT IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT. By
Robert H. Jackson. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1955. Pp. viii,
92. $2.00.
A FEW days after the Supreme Court reconvened for the October Term,
1954, Robert H. Jackson died. In the next several months, the Justice's son
and his law clerk footnoted and brought to publishable form a short manu-
script entitled The Supreme Court in the American System of Government-
three lectures which Justice Jackson had been preparing for delivery at Har-
vard the following February, and which appeared to be "substantially com-
plete"' when he died.
t Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
1. William Eldred Jackson and E. Barrett Prettyman, Jr., who shepherded the Jus-
tice's manuscript into print, say in their Foreword:
"This, therefore, is an unfinished, yet substantially completed, work. It is un-
finished in the sense that had the Justice lived the final product would have been
polished to the perfection which he demanded of himself. It is, however, substantially
completed in the sense that it expresses his matured and deep convictions regarding
the institution of which he had been so close and keen an observer, first from without
and then from within, over the past two decades."
P. viii. Jackson was to have given the 1955 Godkin Lectures at the Harvard Graduate
School of Public Administration. He outlined, drafted and redrafted the lectures through-
out the spring, summer and early fall of 1954. He had been hard at work on them the day
before he died. P. vii.
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According to a venerable principle which has come to be widely regarded
as settled law, de mortuis nil nisi bonum. But the late Justice would himself
have been the last to inflate the principle into a rigid exclusionary rule. First,
because he was rightly suspicious of all vague catchwords: the clich6 that fits
one set of facts may be a "verbal trap" in another.2 Second-and more im-
portant-because he hated cant. "Candor, indeed, was one of his deepest
veins." 3 Ever the adversary, Jackson would have chafed at hiding behind
notions of decorum that fortuitously limited the scope of review.
Viewing Jackson's last work on the merits, then-without any bow to the
amenities-it is hard to avoid the feeling that the Justice's valedictory to the
Court he knew so well is a pretty pedestrian affair. And this is not only
regrettable but surprising. Jackson had, after all, been one of the Court's
most gifted and articulate members for thirteen years (including the year he
was away at Nuremberg prosecuting the major German war criminals). And
for almost a decade before he became a Justice he had been a distinguished
practitioner before the Court in a variety of official capacities. Moreover,
'his Struggle for Judicial Supremacy, written after the armistice between
Franklin Roosevelt and the Court, remains to this day an invaluable account
of how judicial review briefly but calamitously became judicial usurpation.
Nevertheless, the author's wide experience seems to have had little significant
impact on this last work: there are few signs of Jackson's profoundly practical
insights or of his customary vigor and clarity of expression. The book is a
whisper by a man who once talked loud.
In very conventional fashion, the lectures describe the functions of the Su-
preme Court: (a) as one of the three branches of the national government;
(b) as a court adjudicating the kind of litigated matters that Anglo-American
courts have dealt with for centuries; and (c) as a "political institution" arbi-
trating within our federal framework the constitutional controversies arising
between sovereign states, between a state and the nation, between contending
branches of the national government, and between an individual and a state
or the nation. Major themes frequently recurring are the intricate distribution
of power within the federal system, the dangers inherent in substantial cen-
tralization of power,4 and the narrow limits within which judges have au-
2. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 568 (1951) (concurring opinion).
3. Franldurter, Mr. .ustice Jackson, 68 HAxv. L. Ray. 937, 939 (1955).
4. A minor theme that has major implications is Jackson's fear, reinforced by his
study of the rise of Nazism, of an expanded federal police. Coming from a former Attor-
ney General, the following sentences are of more than routine interest:
"I cannot say that our country could have no central police without becoming
totalitarian, but I can say with great conviction that it cannot become totalitarian
without a centralized national police. At his trial Hermann Goering, with great
candor, related the steps by which the Nazi party obtained complete domination of
Germany, and one of the first was the establishment of the supremacy of the national
over the local police authorities. So it was in Russia, and so it has been in every
totalitarian state. All that is necessary is to have a national police competent to
investigate all manner of offenses, and then, in the parlance of the street, it will have
[Vol. 65
REVIEWS
thority or competence to resolve conflicts of major concern to the community.
Under these more generalized headings are to be found little essays on the
mechanics of the Court; the folly of maintaining diversity jurisdiction in the
light of Erie 5 and its progeny; the unplumbed potentialities of the full faith
and credit clause ;G the development of administrative agencies and their re-
lations with courts, and kindred matters. All this is safe, sane and dull.
Nor are there any surprises in Jackson's ultimate conclusions about the
limited capacity of judges to cope with threats to the fundamental framework
of our society. "I know," wrote Jackson, "of no modern instance in which
any judiciary has saved a whole people from the great currents of intolerance,
passion, usurpation, and tyranny which have threatened liberty and free in-
stitutions .... [I]t is my belief that the attitude of a society and of its or-
ganized political forces, rather than its legal machinery, is the controlling force
in the character of free institutions."7 Stated in this general form, the Justice's
thesis can hardly be refuted. It is a cogent but hardly original reminder that
judges and printed words are not enough to preserve the liberties of a people
that has lost interest in remaining free.-
The book would warrant no further comment, were it not for a few sen-
tences in which pedagogy is pushed to the background and Jackson's own
views about the qualities essential to responsible exercise of judicial power
come to the fore. For a few brief moments sparks are struck, and Jackson's
anger at his adversaries illuminates the scene. The sentences, which reduce
to specifics his more general views on judicial restraint, merit close exami-
nation-not because they substantially alter the character of an otherwise dis-
appointing book, but because they help to round out one's picture of the late
Justice:
enough on enough people, even if it does not elect to prosecute them, so that it will
find no opposition to its policies. Even those who are supposed to supervise it are
likely to fear it. I believe that the safeguard of our liberty lies in limiting any na-
tional policing or investigative organization, first of all to a small number of strictly
federal offenses, and secondly to nonpolitical ones. The fact that we may have con-
fidence in the administration of a federal investigative agency under its existing
heads does not mean that it may not revert again to the days when the Department
of Justice was headed by men to whom the investigatory power was a weapon to
be used for their own purposes."
Pp. 70-71.
5. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
6. See JACKSON, FULL FAITH AND CREDIT, THE LAWYER'S CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITU-
TION (1945).
7. Pp. 80-81.
S. Compare the following from Learned Hand's address on "I am an American Day,"
May 21, 1944:
"I often wonder whether we do not rest our hopes too much upon constitutions, upon
laws and upon courts. These are false hopes; believe me, these are false hopes.
Liberty lies in the hearts of men and women; when it dies there, no constitution,
no law, no court can save it .. "
HAND, THE SPIRIT OF LmERTY 189-90 (1952).
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"The question that the present times put into the minds of thoughtful
people is to what extent Supreme Court interpretations of the Constitution
will or can preserve the free government of which the Court is a part. A
cult of libertarian judicial activists now assails the Court almost as bitterly
for renouncing power as the earlier 'liberals' once did for assuming too
much power. This cult appears to believe that the Court can find in a
4,000-word eighteenth-century document or its nineteenth-century Amend-
ments, or can plausibly supply, some clear bulwark against all dangers and
evils that today beset us internally. This assumes that the Court will be
the dominant factor in shaping the constitutional practice of the future and
can and will maintain, not only equality with the elective branches, but a
large measure of supremacy and control over them. I may be biased
against this attitude because it is so contrary to the doctrines of the critics
of the Court, of whom I was one, at the time of the Roosevelt proposal to
reorganize the judiciary. But it seems to me a doctrine wholly incompatible
with faith in democracy, and in so far as it encourages a belief that the
judges may be left to correct the result of public indifference to issues of
liberty in choosing Presidents, Senators, and Representatives, it is a vicious
teaching." 9
Professor Rodell is doubtless right that Hugo L. Black and William 0.
Douglas are the "libertarian judicial activists" whose "vicious teaching" chiefly
stirred Jackson's ire.10 For it is plain that Justices Black and Douglas have
not been reluctant, in an era of cumulative restrictions on personal rights, to
give what Jackson felt to be excessive scope to constitutional guarantees. 1 Yet
Professor Rodell is only half right in his intimation that Jackson was just as
much an "activist" (assuming the word has some identifiable meaning) as
Black and Douglas, but that Jackson limited his "activist" judicial energies to
the protection of property rights.12
It is true that Jackson's Constitution was extremely sensitive to certain types
of economic regulation. For example, its Commerce Clause rigidly forbade
state legislation that Jackson regarded as antithetic to a unified national
economy.' 3 But it is not true that Jackson was wholly unconcerned about
9. Pp. 57-58.
10. Rodell, ustification of a Justice, Saturday Review of Literature, July 16, 1955,
p. 18.
11. See, e.g., their separate dissents in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 579, 581
(1951) ; and Justice Black's dissent, joined in by Justice Douglas, in Adamson v. California,
332 U.S. 46, 68 (1947). Not that Black and Douglas acknowledge the activism attributed
to them. Douglas, indeed, had recent occasion to observe that Black's opinions "disprove
the charge that he is an 'activist' and a devotee of judicial power." Douglas, Mr. Justice
Black: A Foreword, 65 YALE L.J. 449 (1956). It seems safe to say that most judges re-
gard "judicial activism" asan alien "ism" to which their misguided brethren sometimes
fall prey.
12. Rodell, supra note 10, at 18.
13. Jackson in his book candidly disclosed his distrust of local policies that threaten to
turn the nation into "a collection of parasitic states preying upon each other's commerce."
P. 67. See H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949).
Presumably because of his vivid recollection of the dangers posed by a Court which
made the Fourteenth Amendment an ideological road-block to state economic legislation,
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infringements of personal liberty. All that can be said is that some infringe-
ments affected him more profoundly than others. Thus, he consistently chas-
tised his brethren for what he felt was a sentimental over-solicitude for the
due process rights of defendants in state criminal proceedings.' 4 Yet Jackson
frequently manifested substantial concern about invasions of procedural rights
in federal criminal and quasi-criminal proceedings ;1' and he was on occasion
zealous to protect rights under the First Amendment.'( And in the Korernatsu
case he showed a sensitivity not displayed by Justices Black and Douglas to
the rights of American citizens held in custody indefinitely without trial, solely
because of their ancestry. 17 Moreover, Jackson indicated in the Joint Anti-
Fascist case 18 doubts as to the validity of the loyalty program which he made
even more concrete not long before his death:
Jackson had no more enthusiasm than most of his colleagues for relying on "due process" or
"equal protection" to outlaw state economic regulation. But an enactment that was special
enough could provoke his fire. See Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 425
(1952), where Jackson dissented alone from the Court's approval of a Missouri statute
requiring employers to give employees four hours leave with pay on election day. "Perhaps
my difficulty with today's decision is that I cannot rise above an old-fashioned valuation
of American citizenship which makes a state-imposed pay-for-voting system appear to be
a confession of failure of popular representative government . . [A] constitutional
philosophy which sanctions intervention by the State to fix terms of pay without work may
be available tomorrow to give constitutional sanction to state-imposed terms of employment
less benevolent." Id. at 428.
14. See, e.g., his concurring opinion in Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 542 (1953) ; cf.
his opinion for the Court in Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156 (1953). His attitude is hard
to reconcile with his professed belief that lawyers have "a special trust and competence to
safeguard every man's right to a fair trial, on which every other right is dependent." Jack-
son, The American Bar Center: A Testimwny to Our Faith in the Ride of Law, 40 A.B.
A.J. 19,21 (1954).
15. See his dissents in Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180 (1949) (search of
an automobile) ; Frazier v. United States, 335 U.S. 497, 514 (1948) (jury composed of
government employees) ; United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 550
(1950) (Attorney General's refusal to disclose evidence upon which he ordered exclusion
of war bride from United States) ; Shaughnessy v. United States ex reL Mezei, 345 U.S.
206, 218 (1953) (exclusion on undisclosed evidence of resident alien temporarily abroad) ;
and his concurrence in Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 445 (1949) (discussion
of dangers implicit in conspiracy indictments).
16. "If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official,
high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or
other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein."
West Virginia State Bd. of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943). See Jackson's
concurring opinion in Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 544 (1945) ; cf. his dissents in Ever-
son v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 13 (1947) ; Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 323
(1952) ; and his concurrence in Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S.
203, 232 (1948). But cf. Jackson's concurrence in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494,
561 (1951) ; and his dissents in Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 166 (1943);
Saia v. People, 334 U.S. 558, 566 (1948).
17. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 242 (1944).
18. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 183 (1951) (con-
curring opinion).
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"We cannot approve any use of official powers or position to prejudice,
injure or condemn a person in liberty, property or good name which does
not inform him of the source and substance of the charge and give a timely
and open-minded hearing as to its truth, safeguards without which no
judgment can have a sound foundation."'19
In short, it would be foolish to accept Jackson's denunciation of his brethren
as proof that he was not himself an "activist"°2 -- just as it would be foolish to
dismiss Jackson as a business-oriented judge and nothing more. Jackson had
a variety of strongly held beliefs, some of greater merit than others; he used
the Constitution in candid support of his beliefs ;21 and he apparently had only
superficial concern for abstract consistency. 22 "He was the fighting lawyer,
contentious to a fault .... Battle was his only complete element; at best it
gave him wings to soar."12 3 Justice Brandeis declared that Jackson should be
Solicitor General for life.2 4 And Jackson himself, not long before his death,
19. Jackson, supra note 14, at 21. In the book under review Jackson refers critically
to the fact that the Attorney General's list of allegedly subversive organizations has come
to be widely used, notwithstanding the doubt cast on its validity in the Joint Anti-Fascist
case. P. 25.
20. Jackson's opinion in National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S.
582 (1949), asserting that any inferior federal court can be vested with powers not derived
from Article III of the Constitution, deserves special scrutiny in this context. Potentially it
is perhaps the most sweepingly "activist" assertion of judicial power that can be found in the
first three hundred and fifty volumes of the United States Reports. (In Tidewater Jack-
son announced the judgment of the Court-sustaining a federal statute conferring juris-
diction on all district courts to entertain diversity suits involving a citizen of the District
of Columbia-but fortunately his remarkable rationale was supported only by Justices
Black and Burton and therefore did not become an opinion of the Court).
As a contrast to the breadth of Jackson's Tidewater opinion, it is interesting to note
the doubt expressed in his book as to the constitutionality, under the case and controversy
limitation, of asking federal judges to pass upon prosecution requests for permission to
wiretap or for approval of waivers of prosecution where necessary to prevent reliance on
the privilege against self-incrimination. Pp. 11-12. The Court has just recently had occasion
to deal with this issue, in Ullmann v. United States, 24 U.S.L. WEEK 4147 (U.S. Mar. 26,
1956). The Court concluded that, where the conditions set forth in the Immunity Act of
1954 are satisfied, a district judge is without discretion to refrain from ordering a recalci-
trant witness to testify and thereby conferring the statutory immunity from prosecution;
so construed, the statute does not exact of the judge a function that is not "judicial." Id. at
4150. Cf. Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321 (1944).
21. E.g., "I make no concealment of and offer no apology for my philosophy that the
federal interstate commerce power should be strongly supported and that the impingement
of the states upon that commerce which moves among them should be restricted to narrow
limits." P. 67.
22. For example, the text that harmonizes Jackson's reluctance to upset state criminal
convictions and his alacrity to upset state economic controls is the following: "I think it
is a mistake to lump all states' rights together as is done so frequently in political dis-
cussions." P. 66.
23. Jaffe, Mr. Justice Jackson, 68 HARv. L. Ray. 940 (1955).
24. Frankfurter, supra note 3, at 939.
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said in a moment of revealing retrospect: "The hard months at Nuremberg
were spent in the most enduring and constructive work of my life."'25
Perhaps Jackson never should have been a judge. It is at least true that his
chief talents were not judicial ones, and it is questionable whether coming
generations of lawyers and judges will put a high premium on his judicial
achievement. Almost certainly, when future critics have discounted Jackson's
verbal brilliance they will not find in the residue a contribution comparable to
that of Hugo Black, the judge whom Jackson apparently regarded as "the
mind and heart of an opposition party. '26 For present purposes it is sufficient
to recognize that Jackson's last book is the work of a man who felt he should
write about the judicial process but had very little to say.27 At all events, it is
a misnomer to describe the book, in a lawyer's poetic way, as "a remarkable
testament"28 or even as "a remarkable legacy. '29 There are in the book a few
sentences of acrimony which, for good or bad, are reminiscent of a brilliant
advocate. But the rest is silence.
Louis H. POLLAKt
POLITICS, PLANNING, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST: THE CASE OF PUBLIC
HOUSING IN CHICAGO. By Martin Meyerson and Edward C. Banfield. Glen-
coe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1955., Pp. 353. $5.00.
IT is common knowledge that racial segregation is not restricted to the South.
Every major industrial city in the North has a separate all-Negro community
characterized by high population density, a very heavy percentage of slum
dwellings, and steady expansion into whatever contiguous areas it can pene-
trate. The Northern pattern of segregation is much less 'severe than that of
the South, but it has created serious problems in many areas-among them,
housing. Rapid increase in the Negro population of Northern metropolitan
25. Dean, Mr. Justice Jackson: His Contribution at Nuremberg, 41 A.B.A.J. 912
(1955).
26. Jaffe, supra note 23, at 986. The philosophic differences between the two were
profound; so, too-at least for a time-were the personal differences. Jackson, it will be
remembered, felt that Black took advantage of Jackson's absence at Nuremberg to lobby
against Jackson's elevation to the post of Chief Justice. Out of this seems to have grown
Jackson's ill-founded public attack on Black for not disqualifying himself in Jewell Ridge
Coal Corp. v. Local 6167, United Mine Workers, 325 U.S. 161. (1945). See RODELL, NINE
MEN 282 (1955); Frank, Disqualification of Judges, 56 YALE L.J. 605 (1947); Jaffe,
supra note 23, at 986-88.
27. The book's many references to and quotations from Justice Cardozo suggest that
Jackson had taken the great lectures on The Nature of the Judicial Process as his model.
28. Griswold, The High Court in a Democratic System, N.Y. Herald-Tribune, Book
Review Section, July 10, 1955, p. 2.
29. Calm, Balance in the Scales of Justice, N.Y. Times, Book Review Section, July
10,19 55, p. 1.
tAssistant Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
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